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 Abstract 
 
Advances made in medical care mean that many critically ill patients with an acquired brain 
injury may survive with a disorder of consciousness. This may be in the form of a vegetative 
state (VS) or a minimally conscious state (MCS). Medically, there is a growing tendency to 
view these conditions as occupying the same clinical spectrum rather than be considered as 
discrete entities. In other words, their difference is now understood as one of degree rather than 
kind. However, is English law keeping pace with this development in medical knowledge? This 
article seeks to highlight the duality that exists in the legal decision-making process in England 
and Wales, and question the justifiability and sustainability of this dichotomous approach in 
the light of medicine’s current understanding on disorders of consciousness. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Technological advances in medical care have enhanced the capacity and capability to prolong 
the lives of critically ill patients. This development has not, however, courted continual 
celebration. Cases are frequently brought to English courts to determine whether such existence 
is in the best interests of those patients. Prominent among these relate to disorders of 
consciousness particularly those diagnosed as being in a vegetative state (VS) and a minimally 
conscious state (MCS). In just two decades after the first VS case was heard in 1993 by the 
House of Lords, the same court1 ruled on its first MCS case in 2013. Airedale NHS Trust v. 
Bland2 and Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v. James3 are today the seminal 
authorities for how the determination of best interests should be managed for patients in a VS 
and MCS respectively. Two separate approaches are therefore espoused under English Law 
depending on the diagnosis. At the same time, recent medical research increasingly describes 
these two conditions as part of a continuous spectrum rather than distinct disorders. On this 
view, the difference between them is therefore one of degree rather than kind. In light of this 
                                                            
1 Although now under its new name - The Supreme Court. 
2 [1993] 1 All ER 821. 
3 [2013] UKSC 67. 
important development, this article questions whether the dichotomous legal approach is 
justified.   
The discussion will proceed as follows. Part 2 will take a close look at disorders of 
consciousness from a medical perspective. It aims to illustrate that VS and MCS are today 
understood as two states of consciousness that are essentially on the same spectrum. It will also 
highlight the prevalence of diagnostic errors in practice, including in the cases that have come 
before the courts. Part 3 will examine how the law responds to the question of whether the 
provision and continuance of life-sustaining medical intervention including clinically assisted 
nutrition and hydration (CANH) are in the patient’s best interests. It will compare and contrast 
the pathways that have thus far been carved for VS and MCS patients. Part 4 summarises our 
earlier discussion and challenges the sustainability of the dichotomous approach in view of the 
current medical understanding of such disorders and the prevalence of mistakes in diagnosis. 
The work concludes by making a number of recommendations. 
 
 
2 Disorders of Consciousness 
 
The term vegetative state (VS)4 has been in the medical lexicon since 1972.5 It was joined by 
the term MCS three decades later in 2002.6 Both now are part of an umbrella term7 known as 
disorders of consciousness.8 Whether a patient has a disorder of consciousness is dependent on 
two factors: the level of consciousness (wakefulness) and the content of consciousness 
(awareness).9 Patients in a disordered level of consciousness are usually characterised by their 
disordered sleep-wake cycle and this is demonstrated by their somewhat erratic and alternating 
phases of eye opening.10 In contrast, patients in a coma lack a sleep-wake cycle, cannot 
demonstrate signs of wakefulness, and exhibit no features suggestive of awareness.11 Disorders 
of consciousness are almost always secondary to an acquired brain injury, and causes of such 
an injury can be considered either traumatic or non-traumatic. 
 
2.1 Difference of Degree or Kind? 
The main difference between VS and MCS is the level of awareness in wakefulness, i.e. 
differences in the content of consciousness rather than the level.12 Patients in VS are awake 
and may respond to stimulation with spontaneous behaviours, for example gasping or 
grimacing. The characteristic feature of VS patients is the presence of arousal, i.e. being awake, 
                                                            
4 The term is now commonly known simply as vegetative state (VS) in the medical literature, though PVS may 
be used interchangeably with VS in case law. Direct quotes of judgments in this work will use the terms adopted 
by the relevant judges. 
5 B. Jennett and F. Plum, ‘Persistent vegetative state after brain damage: A syndrome in search of a name’, Lancet 
299(7753) (1972) 734-737. 
6 For a discussion of the clinical criteria defining MCS, see J. T. Giacino, et. al., ‘The minimally conscious state: 
definition and diagnostic criteria’, Neurology 58 (2002) 349-353. 
7 O. Gosseries, et. al., ‘Disorders of consciousness: What’s in a name?’, NeuroRehabilitation 28 (2011) 3-14. 
8 S. Laureys, et. al., ‘Unresponsive wakefulness syndrome: a new name for the vegetative state or apallic 
syndrome’, BMC Medicine 8 (2010) 68-71, DOI: 10.1186/1741-7015-8-68. 
9 S. Laureys, et. al., ‘Residual cognitive function in comatose, vegetative and minimally conscious states’, Current 
Opinion in Neurology (2005) 18 (6) 726–733. 
10 The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, ‘Medical aspects of the persistent vegetative state’, New England 
Journal of Medicine 330(21) (1994) 1499–1508. 
11 O. Gosseries, et. al., ‘Disorders of Consciousness: Coma, Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States’ in: D. 
Cvetkovic and I. Cosic (eds.), States of Consciousness (Berlin: Springer-Verlag 2011) pp. 32-33 
12 C. Shnakers, et. al., ‘Diagnostic accuracy of the vegetative and minimally conscious state: Clinical consensus 
versus standardised neurobehavioral assessment’, BMC Neurology 9 (2009) 35-39, DOI: 10.1186/1471-2377-9-
35. 
but without signs of awareness. Such patients are unable to make intelligible verbal 
communication and lack the ability to make any voluntary response to demonstrate self-
awareness or changes to the environment.13 In contrast, the term MCS describes a broad array 
of responsiveness - this may range from patients who are awake making several non-reflex 
movements to seemingly facial or emotional responses in a consistently meaningful manner. 
Therefore, MCS is defined by the presence of variable but reproducible responsive behaviours 
that suggest an underlying, albeit a minimal level of consciousness.14  
There have been various terms used in the past to ascribe the notion of chronicity to 
patients in VS. For patients with an acquired brain injury (regardless of cause) remaining in 
VS for over one month following the injury, such patients are termed to be in a persistent 
vegetative state.15 In contrast, patients with an acquired non-traumatic brain injury in VS lasting 
over 3 months or traumatic brain injury in VS lasting over 1 year are believed to be in a 
permanent vegetative state.16 ‘Persistent VS’ and ‘permanent VS’ have the same abbreviations 
and can often be mistakenly used interchangeably.  
VS and MCS are considered to be prolonged if lasting for longer than one month17, 
though it is possible for patients to remain in these states for many months and years. Some 
patients in VS may remain irreversibly in this clinical condition for many years, 18 yet some 
may evolve and transition into a minimally conscious state.19 Interestingly, a very recent French 
study had demonstrated the possibility of alleviating the consciousness of a patient who have 
been in VS for 15 years by experimental vagus nerve stimulation.20 Though the study was 
limited and only involved one test patient, this experimental treatment was effective and a 
transition from a diagnosis of VS to MCS was observed. Thus, this single-patient study appears 
to support the notion that the entities of VS and MCS are much intertwined, rather than discrete, 
as originally believed. 
The diagnosis of disordered consciousness is heavily reliant on clinical judgement and 
this in turn is based on observations covering several variables. Accurate diagnosis has 
historically been difficult for the following reasons: patients may have an accompanying 
mental or physical disability that may limit their ability to respond to stimulation;21 patients are 
frequently assessed for their consciousness during a time when they are medically unstable; 
                                                            
13 M. Willems, et. al., ‘Longitudinal changes in functioning and disability in patients with disorders of 
consciousness: The importance of environmental factors’, International Journal of Environmental Research and 
Public Health 12(4) (2015) 3707-3730, DOI: 10.3390/ijerph120403707. 
14 D. Wade, ‘Back to the bedside? Making clinical decisions in patients with prolonged unconsciousness’, Journal 
of Medical Ethics 43(7) (2017) 457-458, DOI:10.1136/medethics-2015-103140. 
15 The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, ‘Medical aspects of the persistent vegetative state (Part 1)’, New England 
Journal of Medicine 330(21) (1994) 1499–1508. 
16 American Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine, ‘Recommendations for use of uniform nomenclature pertinent 
to patients with severe alterations of consciousness’, Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation 76 (1995) 
205–209. 
17 This is the same timing clinicians use to reach a diagnosis of persistent VS for patients in a vegetative state and 
considered to be a particularly worrying prognostic milestone. 
18 D. J. Strauss, R. M. Shavelle and S. Ashwal, ‘Life expectancy and median survival time in the permanent 
vegetative state’, Pediatric Neurology 21 (1999) 626-631. 
19 Ibid., at pp. 629-630. 
20 M. Corazzol, et. al., ‘Correspondence: Restoring consciousness with vagus nerve stimulation’, Current Biology 
27 (2017) 994-996. 
21 S. Majerus, et. al., ‘The problem of aphasia in the assessment of consciousness in brain-damaged patients’, 
Progress in Brain Research 177 (2009) 49-61. 
patients’ responses to stimulation are often delayed and inconsistent with poor reproducibility 
of clinical findings;22 and there is a degree of subjectivity in clinical observations.23  
Ever since the concept MCS was characterised, several authors have questioned the use 
of differentiating between it and VS.24 Several prospective studies have shown that the 
prevailing prognoses of patients in MCS are comparatively better than that of VS. Nevertheless, 
both of these prognoses remain poor with many in MCS may continue to remain severely 
disabled.25 The European Task Force on Disorders of Consciousness has recently proposed that 
the nosology of VS and MCS be part of a clinical and diagnostic spectrum rather than distinct 
clinical entities. This is in recognition that a spectrum may exist where some patients in MCS 
may only demonstrate non-reflex movements akin to that of VS, through to patients retaining 
the ability to make reproducible behavioural interactions like command following and 
communication.26 Depending on where on this VS/MCS spectrum patients lie, it is believed 
that those on the spectrum resembling closest to VS are likely to suffer severe disability. On 
the whole, the scientific and medical view on disorders of consciousness is that the dichotomy 
between VS and MCS is likely to be false,27 and that significant overlap has been demonstrated 
to occur between the two clinical entities.    
 
2.2    Prevalence of Diagnostic Errors  
Given that patients may evolve, transition28, or recover from a state of disordered 
consciousness, making a clinical determination on the nature of the disorder is often 
challenging.29 Neurophysiological and neuro-radiological studies comparing VS and MCS 
patients have indeed demonstrated clear but subtle differences30. Although the scientific 
discussion of these differences is beyond the scope of this paper, such neurophysiological 
findings can aid in the formulation of disorder of consciousness – though such diagnoses are 
primarily made by clinical judgement. Moreover, the practical difficulties involved in 
                                                            
22 N. L. Childs, W. N. Mercer and H. W. Childs, ‘Accuracy of diagnosis of persistent vegetative state’, Neurology 
43(8) (1993) 1465-1467. 
23 A. C. Byram, et. al., ‘Ethical and clinical considerations at the intersection of functional neuroimaging and 
disorders of consciousness – The experts weigh in’, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 25 (2016) 613-
622. 
24 M.A. Bruno, et. al., ‘Assessment of consciousness with electrophysiological and neurological imaging 
techniques’, Current Opinion in Critical Care 17 (2011) 146-151. 
25 For a fuller discussion on the long term outcomes of patients in VS versus MCS, see J. Luaute, et. al., ‘Long-
term outcome of chronic minimally conscious and vegetative states’, Neurology 75 (2010) 246-252; and G. Dolce, 
et. al., ‘Clinical signs and early prognosis in vegetative state: a decisional tree, data-mining study’, Brain Injury 
22 (2008) 617-623. 
26 Gosseries, supra note 7. 
27 Strauss, et. al., supra note 18; J. Luaute, et. al., ‘Long-term outcome of chronic minimally conscious and 
vegetative states’, Neurology 75 (2010) 246-252;  O. Gosseries, et. al., supra note 7.  
28 I.e., initially diagnosed with MCS but subsequently deteriorate into VS or vice versa where the VS condition 
improves into MCS. 
29 A. Demertzi, et. al., ‘Is there anybody in there? Detecting awareness in disorders of consciousness’, Expert 
Review of Neurotherapeutics 8 (2008) 1719-1730. 
30 For discussions on the neurophysiological differences between VS and MCS see:  E. Landsness, et. al., 
‘Electrophysiological correlates of behavioural changes in vigilance in vegetative state and minimally conscious 
state’ Brain 134 (2011) 2222-2232; E. Formaggio, et. al., ‘Assessment of event-related EEG power after single-
pulse TMS in unresponsive wakefulness syndrome and minimally conscious state patients’, Brain Topography 29 
(2016) 322-333; A. A. Fingelkurts, et. al., ‘The value of spontaneous EEG oscillations in distinguishing patients 
in vegetative and minimally conscious states’, Clinical Neurophysiology 62 Suppl (2013) 81-99; G. Varotto, et. 
al., ‘Altered resting state effective connectivity in long-standing vegetative state patients: an EEG study’, Clinical 
Neurophysiology 125 (2014) 63-68. 
translating neuroscientific discoveries of residual cognitive function in both VS and MCS 
patients continue to contribute to misdiagnosis at the clinical level.31 
  Previous studies have demonstrated that up to 37-43 per cent of patients diagnosed to 
be in VS had some clinically demonstrable signs of awareness suggestive that MCS was a more 
appropriate diagnosis.32 A prospective study in 2006 had found that 29 patients diagnosed with 
VS were subsequently identified to have MCS.33 Although the criteria for the diagnosis for 
both VS and MCS are well defined in the literature, misdiagnoses between the two entities 
continue to persist.34 This may be due to a lack of standardisation on how patients in either VS 
or MCS are identified and assessed.35 
Various factors that are thought to be contributory to the rate of misdiagnosis: (1) 
patients in a state of disordered consciousness often have very limited physical function, which 
is the mainstay of how patients demonstrate awareness; (2) there are difficulties in 
differentiating between what is voluntary and reflexive behaviours which in turn are 
compounded by inconsistencies between clinical assessors in their observations for signs of 
consciousness;36 and (3) there is a lack of tailored quantitative assessment procedures that 
document temporal trends and reproducibility of particular behaviours that are patient-
specific.37 Furthermore, a comprehensive diagnostic workup combining clinical behavioural, 
neurophysiological, and brain imaging modalities would mitigate the degree of misdiagnosis.38  
This prevalence of diagnostic errors is certainly discernible in the existing case law. In 
W v. M,39 for instance, the patient was initially thought to be in VS before further investigation 
transpired in a revised diagnosis of MCS. Similarly, in St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v. 
P (by his litigation friend, the Official Solicitor) and Q,40 the patient was presented as being in 
a VS at the start of the hearing, only for the diagnosis to be altered to MCS at the end of the 
case. Likewise in M v. Mrs N (by her litigation friend, the Official Solicitor), Bury Clinical 
Commissioning Group, A Care Provider,41 the expert witnesses could not agree throughout the 
hearing on whether the patient was in a VS or MCS. This led the judge, Mr Justice Hayden, to 
remark that: ‘any “bright line” delineation between PVS and MCS is largely, perhaps even, 
entirely, artificial’.42 This observation corresponds with the informed clinical suggestion that 
VS and MCS share significant overlaps in regards to the content of consciousness. As 
discussed, it is clear that these entities only differ in degree rather than kind. Since any 
dichotomous separation between them is likely to be false, is the current legal approach 
justified? 
                                                            
31 B. Kotchoubey, ‘Apallic syndrome is not apallic: is vegetative state vegetative?’, Neuropsychological  
Rehabilitation 15 (2005) 333-356. 
32 K. Andrews, et. al., ‘Misdiagnosis of the vegetative state: retrospective study in a rehabilitation unit’, British 
Medical Journal 313 (1996) 13-16; Childs, Mercer and Childs, supra note 22. 
33 C. Schnakers, et. al., ‘Does the FOUR score correctly diagnose the vegetative state and minimally conscious 
states?’, Annals of Neurology 60 (2006) 744-745. 
34 N. D. Zasler, ‘Terminology in evolution: caveats, conundrums and controversies’ Neurorehabilitation 19 (2004) 
285-292; M. Graham, et. al., ‘Acknowledging awareness: informing families of individual research results for 
patients in the vegetative state’, Journal of Medical Ethics 41 (2015) 534-538. 
35 Kotchoubey, supra note 31. 
36 S. Majerus, et. al., ‘Behavioural evaluation of consciousness in severe brain damage’, Progress in Brain 
Research 150 (2005) 397-413. 
37 J. Whyte, M. C. DiPasquale and M. Vaccaro, ‘Assessment of command-following in minimally conscious brain 
injured patients’, Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation 80 (1999) 653-660. 
38 J. T. Giacino and C. M. Smart, ‘Recent advances in behavioural assessment of individuals with disorders of 
consciousness’, Current Opinion in Neurology 20 (2007) 614-619. 
39 [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam). 
40 [2015] EWCOP 15. 
41 [2015] EWCOP 76. 
42 Para. 73. 
  
3 VS and MCS: The Legal Frameworks 
 
English courts have had the daunting task of adjudicating on prolonged disorders of 
consciousness cases for the last quarter of a century. This began when Airedale NHS Trust 
sought a declaration that it would be lawful for all LST to be withdrawn and subsequently 
withheld from a patient who have been in a VS for over 3 years after his lungs were punctured 
and ribs crushed in the Hillsborough Disaster of April 1989. Given the uniqueness and novelty 
of the situation at the time, as well as the grave repercussions of the declaration sought, the 
case made it all the way to the House of Lords. By contrast, the first few MCS cases43 did not 
reach the highest court in the land, now the Supreme Court. This only took place in 2013 in 
Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v. James.44 These two landmark cases set 
out the legal framework for determining the best interests of VS and MCS patients respectively. 
This section will take a close look at what they prescribe for these two conditions, and analyse 
their similarities and differences. It will also examine the relevant sections of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005, a statute passed by Parliament midway between these two landmark cases.  
 
3.1     Determination of Best Interests 
3.1.1 Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland 
This case, as is well-known, concerned a football fan, Anthony Bland, who suffered from 
hypoxic brain damage after being seriously injured in the Hillsborough Disaster. When the 
prospect of improvement or retention of consciousness seemed no longer in sight, a court 
declaration was sought by his doctors, with the support of his parents. This was for a 
pronouncement that it would be lawful to have all LST and medical support including CANH 
withdrawn, and thereafter for medical treatment to be withheld. As these were with a view to 
letting him die, the declaration was opposed by the Official Solicitor who argued that such a 
move would amount to manslaughter if not murder. 
In a judgement that engaged no small amount of creativity, the House of Lords granted 
the declaration by putting forward a number of controversial propositions.45 One, that CANH 
was considered as medical treatment rather than basic care, as they involve the application of 
medical technique.46 Two, that the removal of LST and medical support, though clearly 
requiring a physical act, constituted a permissible omission from a legal perspective. Three, 
both on the issue of removal and of the subsequent withholding of medical treatment including 
CANH, doctors were given assurance that they would not be breaching their legal duty of care 
as it would no longer be in Bland’s best interests to receive those interventions.  
 In determining best interests, it was first acknowledged that Bland was indeed still alive 
as his brainstem was functioning. However, it was ruled that the duty of doctors towards a 
patient in VS does not extend to prolonging his life at all costs.47 Where ‘the patient is totally 
unconscious and where there is no hope whatsoever of any amelioration of his condition’,48 the 
principle of sanctity of life must yield to the doctor’s duty to act in the best interests of the 
patient. According to Lord Goff, the question to be asked ‘is not whether it is in the best 
interests of the patient that he should die. [Rather], [t]he question is whether it is in the best 
                                                            
43 E.g. W v. M [2011] EWHC 2443; [2012] 1 WLR 110; An NHS Trust v. L [2012] EWHC 4313 (Fam). 
44 Supra note 3. 
45 For discussion, see J. Laing, ‘Food and fluids: human law, human rights and human interests’, in: C. Tollefsen 
(ed.), Artificial Nutrition and Hydration: The New Catholic Debate (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008) pp. 80-85. 
46 Per Lord Keith. 
47 Airedale NHS Trust Bland [1993] AC 789 per Butler-Sloss LJ. at p. 823. 
48 Per Lord Goff. 
interests of the patient that his life should be prolonged by the continuance of this form of 
medical treatment or care’.49 The latter, according to His Lordship, ‘can sensibly be answered 
to the effect that it is not in his best interests to do so’.50  
Hence since LST is considered futile (in the sense of not carrying any therapeutic value) 
for VS patients, it follows that it is not in their best interests to continue receiving it. As to the 
question of futility, this was to be determined by doctors in accordance with the Bolam test, 
thus restricting both the notions of futility and best interests to be viewed only from a medical 
perspective.51 The House of Lords nevertheless stated that court declarations must be sought 
in future whenever doctors contemplate withdrawing CANH from VS patients.52  
 
3.1.2 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 
Before the legal framework for MCS is explored, it is necessary to highlight that the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 was passed midway between the House of Lords’ judgment in Airedale and 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Aintree. This Act placed decision-making process for all 
incapacitated patients (including VS and MCS patients) with the Court of Protection. 
Importantly, it gives legislative recognition to the key issues averred by the House of Lords in 
Airedale.  
The most notable is the endorsement that LST can be withdrawn and withheld from 
patients who are not legally dead. This is through a number of routes. According to the Act, all 
adults can, when competent, make an advance decision for LST to be withdrawn and withheld 
when they are incapable of making the decision in the future.53 They can also appoint donees 
by conferring upon them a lasting power of attorney to make such a decision for them when 
they are not competent to do so.54 For incompetent patients without advance decisions or 
appointed donees, the court is empowered to make a declaration on the lawfulness of any act 
done or about to be done.55 Like Airedale, an act in this context includes omission.56 Further 
confirming the House of Lords’ standpoint, paragraph 5.31 of the Act’s Code of Practice 
provides that, ‘where treatment is futile, overly burdensome to the patient or where there is no 
prospect of recovery… it may be that an assessment of best interests leads to the conclusion 
that it would be in the best interests of the patient to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining 
treatment, even if this may result in the person’s death’. 
In addition, section 1(5) of the Act makes clear that any acts done or decision made 
under the Act for or on behalf of one who lacks capacity must be done or made in their best 
interests. In determining what is in their best interests, the court must apply the provisions 
outlined in section 4 of the Act. Thus any assessment of whether LST is in the best interests of 
the patient must not be motivated by a desire to bring about the patient’s death.57 It is crucial 
to consider the patient’s past and present wishes and feelings; his beliefs and values that are 
likely to influence his decision if he had capacity and other factors that he would be likely to 
consider if he were able to do so.58 Views must be taken of anyone named by the patient as 
someone to be consulted on such matters; anyone caring for the patient or who takes an interest 
                                                            
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 At pp. 870 and 874. 
53 S. 24(1). 
54 Section 9. 
55 Section 15(1) 
56 Section 15(2) 
57 S4(5) 
58 S4(6) 
in his welfare; anyone whom the patient has granted a lasting power of attorney and any deputy 
appointed by the court.59  
Another fundamental endorsement of Airedale can be found in paragraph 5(a) of the 
Act’s Practice Direction E. This specifically states that decisions about proposed withholding 
or withdrawal of CANH must be brought to court not only for VS patients, but also for MCS 
patients.60 However, as the discussion below will demonstrate, best interests and how far the 
factors outlined in section 4 of the Act are engaged, are determined differently in court 
depending on whether a patient was diagnosed as VS or MCS.  
 
3.1.3 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v. James 
Compared to VS, the first few MCS cases were only heard by the Court of Protection. Aintree, 
apart from being the first MCS case heard by the Supreme Court, was also the first case under 
the 2005 Act to come before this court. It is also unique in that the case was heard 
posthumously. It was initially brought to the Court of Protection by the doctors of David James 
who was gravely ill at the Aintree University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust. He had a host 
of medical problems including a diagnosis of MCS. The hospital sought a declaration that it 
would be in his best interests and thereby lawful to withhold the following LST in the event of 
a clinical deterioration: invasive support for circulatory problems; renal replacement therapy; 
and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). This decision was objected to by his family. The 
Court of Protection refused to grant the declaration61 but this was overturned by the Court of 
Appeal.62 Although James passed away after the Court of Appeal hearing, his wife was given 
permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.  
At this juncture, it is worth noting that prior to Aintree, the courts have taken a position 
that stands in polar opposite to VS cases. It was held that it was never in the best interests of 
MCS patients for LST to be withdrawn.63 In so proceeding, determination of best interests 
failed to apportion proper weighting to precedent autonomy, wishes and beliefs of both the 
patients and their families.64 Although the views of the patient and their family and other carers 
were taken into consideration, preservation of life carried ‘very great weight’65 in that 
balancing exercise. This was such that the principle of sanctity of life trumped very strong 
evidence as to the patient’s wishes.66 In Aintree, although the Supreme Court’s starting point 
was a similarly strong presumption that it is in a person’s best interests to remain alive, it was 
acknowledged that there are cases where it will not be in a patient’s best interests to receive 
LST. With James’ situation sadly considered as one, the court upheld the Court of Appeal’s 
decision. It nevertheless helpfully provided clarification on a number of issues. 
One, that in the case of MCS patients, the proper question to ask is whether it is in the 
patient’s best interests to be given a particular serious medical treatment.67 And almost for the 
purpose of drawing a distinction with PVS, Lady Hale emphasised that it is this that should be 
the focus ‘rather than on whether it is in his best interests to withhold or withdraw it.’68 Two, 
                                                            
59 S4(7) 
60 Practice Direction 9e (which supplements Part 9 of the Court of Protection 2007). 
61 An NHS Trust v. DJ [2012] EWHC 3524 (COP) 
62 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v. James [2013] EWCA Civ 65 
63 W v. M [2011] EWHC 2443; An NHS Trust v. L [2012] EWHC 4313 (Fam). 
64 W. Glannon, ‘Burdens of ANH outweigh benefits in the minimally conscious state’, Journal of Medical Ethics 
39 (2013) 551-552; A.L. Hebron and S. McGee, ‘Precedent autonomy should be respected in life-sustaining 
decisions’, Journal of Medical Ethics 40(10) (2014) 714-716. 
65 W v. M, supra note 64, per Baker J. at 222. 
66 J. Lombard, ‘Navigating the decision-making framework for patients in a minimally conscious state’, Medico-
Legal Journal of Ireland (2016) 78 at 83. 
67 Supra note 3, para. 21 (our emphasis). 
68 Ibid., para. 22. 
echoing the ethos of the Mental Capacity Act, the Supreme Court affirmed that medical factors 
form only part of a wider panorama of best interests for the individual. As remarked by Her 
Ladyship: 
 
decision-makers must look at his welfare in the widest sense, not just medical but social 
and psychological; they must consider the nature of the medical treatment in question, 
what it involves and its prospects of success; they must consider what the outcome of 
that treatment for the patient is likely to be; they must try to put themselves in the place 
of the individual patient and ask what his attitude is or would be likely to be; and they 
must consult others who are looking after him or interested in his welfare, in particular 
for their view of what his attitude would be.69  
 
Three, it was confirmed that the purpose of the Mental Capacity Act is to enable the courts to 
do for an individual what one could do for himself if he had full mental capacity but nothing 
more.70 A ‘balance sheet’ of the advantages and disadvantages of a proposed course of action 
is prescribed.71 In other words, what are the benefits and challenges associated with the 
continuation of LST? This evaluation needs to be made in tandem with a consideration and 
weighing of all factors in the Act’s best interests checklist as well as all available information 
about the patient’s views as regards LST i.e. his likely precedent wishes and feelings, in 
consultation with his family members and carers. Unlike pre-Aintree MCS cases, all these 
relevant factors are assessed in detail, rather than for the preservation or sanctity of life to carry 
inordinate weight.72 This balance sheet is to facilitate an assessment of whether a particular 
serious medical treatment is worth giving or continuing.  
Fourthly, when exploring the wordings of paragraph 5.31 of the Mental Capacity Act’s 
Code of Practice,73 a number of clarifications were provided. Medical interventions, it was 
stated, could not be said to be futile in the sense that they could only return the patient to a 
quality of life that was not worth living.74 Further, whether there was any prospect of recovery, 
this did not mean a return to full health as ‘will avert the looming prospect of death’.75 Rather, 
it is sufficient if the continuation of the medical treatment enables the resumption of a quality 
of life which the patient would consider worthwhile. However, it was added that reasonable 
steps should be taken to ensure that the giving or continuation of a particular treatment would 
not have the resulting effect of causing intolerable suffering. If it does, the matter transforms 
into the analysis of futility.76 This ‘touchstone of intolerability’ is therefore used to decide 
whether the presumption in favour of the continuation of life has been rebutted.77 Since ‘if the 
treatment is not in his best interests, the court will not be able to give its consent on his behalf 
and it will follow that it will be lawful to withhold or withdraw it. Indeed, it will follow that it 
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will not be lawful to give it’.78 These, which include CANH, would be tantamount to an 
omission. 
By virtue of the balance sheet exercise, patients are not automatically resigned to just one 
fate as in the case of VS. Instead, MCS cases post-Aintree have generated mixed outcomes. It 
was ruled in at least one case that treatment should continue to be given,79 while it was held 
that it should not be so in a number of other cases.80 Further, consistent with the Mental 
Capacity Act, the Supreme Court expects hospitals and doctors to seek declaration from the 
courts concerning the lawfulness of providing CANH to MCS patients. 
 
3.2     A Comparative Analysis 
It seems clear from the discussion above that there are key differences in the trends that have 
developed for VS and MCS cases. One of these relates to how the issue of further medical 
treatment is framed for judicial consideration. For VS patients, the approach is to ask whether 
it is in the best interests of the patient for LST to be withdrawn and withheld. The purpose of a 
court declaration therefore pertains to the lawfulness of withdrawing and withholding 
treatment. For MCS patients, the approach is to ask whether it is in their best interests to be 
given treatment. The purpose of a court declaration therefore concerns the lawfulness of 
continuing and providing treatment. This imports an initial presumption to preserve life in 
favour of treatment and pay more heed to the principle of sanctity of life than for VS patients, 
but must ultimately yield to the tolerability of the interventions.  
The second difference flows from, and is connected to the first. As mentioned 
previously, it is now clear that the treatment does not necessarily have to imply cure or to return 
the patient to full or reasonable health. It is acceptable that if treatment is capable of allowing 
the resumption of a quality of life which the patient would regard as worthwhile, then it is 
reasonable to continue receiving the treatment. However, in the case of VS, it is usually held 
that there is no advantage to be gained in any attempts to prolong the patient’s survival through 
the continual use of artificial and invasive procedures.81 The patient, it is observed, will neither 
improve nor recover awareness.82 As noted by Mr Justice Baker in Gloucestershire Clinical 
Commissioning Group v. AB (by his litigation friend, the Official Solicitor), CD83, ‘this state 
(PVS) is permanent and that there is no prospect of any recovery’.84 This echoes Lord Goff’s 
observation in Airedale that this condition is one where ‘there is no prospect of any 
improvement’85 so much so that ‘life-prolonging treatment is properly to be regarded as being 
in medical terms useless’.86 And where the treatment is futile and no longer in the patient’s best 
interests, the courts have made it clear that they should not be subjected to anything further 
than those which are necessary to allow them to pass peacefully and with dignity.87 Thus where 
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a diagnosis of VS is confirmed, the courts have consistently countenanced the withdrawal of 
LST.88  
This takes us to the third distinction which is that the best interests criteria outlined in 
section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act are almost bypassed, with an automatic assumption made 
that it is in the best interests of VS patients to no longer be in receipt of LST and be allowed to 
die. This approach seems to contradict or compromise paragraph 5.32 of the Act’s Code of 
Practice which states that: 
 
before deciding to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment, the decision maker 
must consider the range of treatment options available to work out what would be in 
the person’s best interests. All the factors in the best interests’ checklist should be 
considered, and in particular, the decision-maker should consider any statements that 
the person has previously made about their wishes and feelings about life-sustaining 
treatment.  
 
Indeed, these factors are only considered in MCS cases where a balance sheet exercise 
is prescribed. Thus for judges, where the patient is in a PVS, ‘identifying best interests is a 
clearer exercise’.89 According to Mr Justice Baker, for instance, ‘the balance sheet approach is 
not normally appropriate because all the factors that are relevant normally fall on one side of 
the scale’.90 Once it is established that the patient is in VS, ‘it is axiomatic that treatment is 
futile’91 and ‘the decision whether to continue life-prolonging treatment does not involve a 
weighing operation of competing factors’.92 To put it simply, it is no longer in the patient’s 
interest to continue receiving LST, and that it is lawful and in their best interests for CANH to 
be withdrawn. 
Contrasted to this, where the patient to whom further LST was to be given is in MCS, 
an assessment must be made of their best interests. Mr Justice Baker pointed out in the early 
case of W v. M that MCS is ‘not condition that in the course of any balancing exercise the 
scales would always point in favour of withdrawal in every case’.93 Rather, it was 
acknowledged that ‘[w]ithin MCS, there is a spectrum of consciousness extending from 
patients who are only just above the VS to those who are bordering on full consciousness’.94 
This gives rise to a need to engage in an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
continuation of LST. Where it is not in the patients’ best interests for LST to be continued, it 
is unlawful for it to be given. In the case of United Lincolnshire Hospitals NHS Trust v. N, for 
example, LST was removed from the MCS patient as it was regarded as not being in her best 
interests for ‘invasive, risk laden, medical care as would be involved in a further attempt at 
artificial feeding’95 to be continued. This is irrespective of protestations from family even on 
grounds of religious beliefs.96 The court stressed that although the wishes, views and feelings 
of the patient must be accorded utmost respect, they are not determinative of the patient’s best 
interests. They would have to be weighed against other considerations like the nature of the 
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contemplated treatment, how intrusive it might be and the likely outcome.97 As for the views 
and feelings of family members, these must always be subordinate to the patient’s best 
interests, objectively assessed.98 
 Indeed, the differing and contrasting approaches were made very clear by Mr Justice 
Newton in Cwm Taf University v. F.99 According to His Lordship, ‘[t]he important distinction 
of diagnosis (between minimally conscious state and vegetative states) so far as the court is 
concerned self-evidently dictates a different path, with different considerations and vastly 
different outcomes. In relation to a permanent vegetative state it may mean that the LST is 
futile, whereas in a MCS the court takes a holistic balance sheet approach’100. The decision for 
VS patients is therefore made on the basis of an objective assessment of their best interests 
which is a one size fits all best interest test. Whereas for MCS patients, the courts observe the 
Mental Capacity Act’s instruction to ensure that the patients’ previously expressed views, 
wishes, values, beliefs and other factors they are likely to consider if they are able to do so, are 
taken into account. With these serving as essential components of the decision,101 the best 
interests assessment is interpreted from the patient’s viewpoint.102  
The two diagnoses nevertheless share a number of characteristics from a legal 
perspective. The concern of both is as to whether it is in the best interests of the patients that 
their lives should be prolonged by the continuance of the relevant treatment and care.103 Where 
the provision of LST is considered futile or intolerable, this can be legally withdrawn to allow 
the VS or MCS patient to die. Its removal or withholding is recognised as an omission rather 
than an act which causes the patient’s death. Alongside this, CANH can also be removed and 
further withheld as it is considered as medical treatment rather than basic care. Although this 
could lead to agitation and distress that may persist for a period of days and weeks due to the 
protracted dying process from starvation and hydration,104 courts have refrained from allowing 
the death to be expedited through the administration of a lethal injection.105 An artificial line is 
therefore maintained between killing and allowing to die (i.e. act versus omission) 106 to allow 
the court to assure doctors that they are no longer under a duty to treat the patient, and that the 
withdrawal and withholding do not generate criminal liability for the consequent death.107 
Rather, the death is said to have been caused by the patient’s natural condition.  
Another shared feature is that there is a requirement to seek a declaratory relief from 
the court whenever the removal of CANH is contemplated from patients diagnosed as VS or 
MCS. As we finalised the last draft of the present paper, the Court of Protection ruled in M v. 
                                                            
97  Ibid, per Hayden J. at para.10. 
98 Ibid, para. 20. 
99 Supra note 80. 
100 Ibid., para. 13. 
101 B. Clough, ‘ “People like that”: Realising the social model in mental capacity jurisprudence’, Medical Law 
Review 23(1) (2014) 53-80 at 63. 
102 S.D. Pattinson, ‘Contemporaneous and advance requests: The fight for rights at the end of life’ in: J. Herring 
and J. Wall (eds.), Landmark Cases in Medical Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015) pp. 255-270 at 269. 
103 Per Lord Goff and Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Airedale NHS Trust supra note 2, at pp. 868 & 884 and per 
Charles J. in Briggs supra note 80, para. 17. 
104 M.Y. Rady and J.L. Verheijde, ‘Nonconsensual withdrawal of nutrition and hydration in prolonged disorders 
of consciousness: authoritarianism and trustworthiness in medicine’, Philosophy, Ethics and Humanities in 
Medicine 9 (2014) 16 at 18.  
105 Removal of CANH, it has been claimed, is ethically inferior to actively ending that life in this manner – see Z. 
Fritz, ‘Can “best interests” derail the trolley? Examining withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration 
in patients in the permanent vegetative state’, Journal of Medical Ethics (2015), DOI:10.1136/medethics-2015-
103045. 
106 A.M. Capron, ‘Borrowed lessons: The role of ethical distinctions in framing law on life-sustaining treatment’ 
(1984) Arizona State Law Journal 647 at 650. 
107 S. Halliday, et. al., ‘An assessment of the court’s role in the withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and 
hydration from patients in the permanent vegetative state’, Medical Law Review 23(4) (2015) 556-587 at 566. 
A Hospital108 that court oversight is no longer required where the family are in agreement with 
the treating team that it is in the best interests of the patient that LST be stopped. To withdraw 
CANH, the treating team would need to act in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act and 
the prevailing professional guidance.109 This absence of a need for court ruling, it was reasoned, 
would avoid putting additional pressure on the overstretched public health resources, and 
prevent prolonged suffering for the patient and his family.110 The impact of this judgment is 
still uncertain, not least because it had come from a lower court, and that the Official Solicitor 
is said to likely launch an appeal.111 What is clear, is that court declaration is still required 
where families and the treating teams are not in agreement as to whether the removal of CANH 
is in the patients’ best interests; and is still available in any case in which the parties deem right 
to involve the courts.112 
 
 
4 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Patients with disorders of consciousness are not terminally ill113 or as Keown puts it, ‘neither 
dead nor dying’.114 They can continue to live with the assistance of LST and CANH for an 
indeterminate period.115 Given the severe compromise in their apparent quality of life, the issue 
of whether it is in their best interests to persist in this state of existence comes up with alarming 
regularity. However, as discussed, the approaches taken are divergent.  
In VS, withdrawal of LST including CANH would always be allowed as they are 
automatically considered futile. Thus a blanket approach is taken in regards to this condition. 
In other words, it is the diagnosis which decides the outcome. For MCS by contrast, it is the 
patient who is the central focus of the decision-making process. His or her wishes, views and 
attitudes as well as the advantages and disadvantages of providing him or her with LST receive 
a fuller analysis. Withdrawal could only be allowed when LST is deemed to cause intolerable 
suffering. In MCS, a decision is therefore made only after a host of factors are considered, none 
of which holds or are accorded greater gravity than the other. The diagnosis itself does not 
wholly determine the outcome. Whereas, it is still considered to be in the best interest of VS 
patients for LST to be withdrawn on grounds of futility and for the determination of best 
interests only to be viewed from a medical perspective. Hence despite the passage of a quarter 
of a century and the deepening of medical understanding of disorders of consciousness during 
this time period, Airedale remains the leading authority for the determination of the best 
interests of VS patients. 
 However, as discussed previously, VS and MCS are now perceived as conditions that 
lie on the same spectrum. In fact, the distinction between VS and MCS from a medical 
perspective is often very difficult to define and wrought with many individualised patient 
factors and variables. The Court of Protection makes its demand that an accurate diagnosis of 
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disorder of consciousness be made and clinical guidance followed in order for it to make a 
decision.116 In the context of misdiagnosis, the surrogate decision-making processes from a 
legal perspective may lead to separate medical and legal outcomes. Within the current case 
law, the accuracy and the nature of the underlying diagnosis in a patient with a disorder of 
consciousness is of paramount importance given that the judicial approach on VS patients is to 
consider whether it is in their best interests to withdraw LST, whilst with MCS it is whether it 
is in their best interests to provide LST. 
With the introduction of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the use of best interests testing 
adds some degree of transparency in judicial surrogate decision-making. It is therefore not 
wholly unreasonable to advance the argument that all patients in any disorder of consciousness 
should be subjected to the same best interests test in accordance with the Act. This measure 
would allow the advantages and disadvantage of LST and CANH to be carefully considered 
and weighed, and antecedent views from the individual and relatives heard. Thus, the Supreme 
Court’s approach in its ruling on Aintree, which applied the relevant provisions from the 2005 
Act should be advocated as the reference point when considering the best interests of an 
individual in a disorder of consciousness, unable to make informed choices, and whose best 
interests are uncertain. A balance sheet of advantages and disadvantages should therefore be a 
major determinant on whether a mental incapacitated patient with a disorder of consciousness 
be lawfully given LST.  
If all patients with a disorder of consciousness (irrespective of whether VS or MCS) are 
reviewed by the courts in a similar and standardised fashion, then it would follow that the 
impact of misdiagnosis (or rather confusion between the two clinical entities) on a court’s 
surrogate decision-making would be mitigated. Errors and mistakes in such a circumstance 
propagated by a misdiagnosis will have serious legal consequences.117  In view of this, it is fair 
to propose that the legal logic used in understanding the best interests of a patient in VS 
advanced in the Bland judgement to be antiquated. With current medical advances made on the 
research in disorders of consciousness, adopting a uniform judicial approach irrespective of VS 
or MCS would represent a paradigm shift on how surrogate decisions for patients with 
disorders of consciousness are made. This shift will also be reflective of the increasingly 
accepted medical viewpoint that VS and MCS fall on the same spectrum of disorder of 
consciousness and that the difference between the two is one of degree rather than in kind.  
This article will conclude by maintaining that a dichotomous judicial approach for 
patients in a disorder of consciousness (i.e. one set of case law for VS patients and another for 
MCS patients), is not justified. It is recommended that VS patients should now be brought 
under the same legal framework used for MCS patients. This move would represent a more 
convergent and transparent approach to surrogate decision making involving the retention or 
removal of LST and CANH. To clarify, what we are advocating is for all patients with a 
disorder of consciousness to undergo the same legal process. Our concern is therefore not with 
the outcomes. Be it the continuation or withdrawal of LST and CANH, the outcome would in 
our view be defensible as long as the process is satisfactory. It goes without saying, however, 
that inasmuch as this step is necessitated by the current state of medical knowledge, it does not 
represent the conclusive legal framework for disorders of consciousness. This is, after all, a 
fast-moving area of medicine.118 As it evolves, so must the law. The existence of two distinct 
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decision-making frameworks does not align well with the current state of medical knowledge. 
Their preservation only serves to widen the gap between the two disciplines. 
Lastly, although some commentators, as now supported by the Court of Protection, have 
advocated for decision-making power to vest in doctors, thereby doing away with court 
involvement particularly where all interested parties agree on withdrawal,119 this is not a 
position we support. Indeed, as observed by Mr Justice Baker in the Oxford Shrieval Lecture, 
‘until such time that as we have greater clarity and understanding about the disorders of 
consciousness, and about the legal and ethical principles to be applied, there remains a need 
for independent oversight’.120 Considering the gravity of the decisions, it is only natural that 
these should be open to public scrutiny as how these decisions are made at the court level 
concerns everyone in the wider society.121  With proper court oversight, this would ensure 
public safety and offer protection to the vulnerable.122 This is undeniably costly, but as aptly 
noted by Mr Justice Hayden in Cumbria NHS Clinical Commissioning Group v. Miss S, Mrs 
D, Miss T, ‘[t]hose who are [believed to be] beyond pain, understanding or without any true 
consciousness require vigilant protection of their rights and interests, all the more so because 
of their unique level of vulnerability’.123  
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